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JURISDICTION
This

appeal

is

from

OF
an

THE
Order

COURT
Construing

Will

and

Determining Heirs, a final order of the Fifth District Court for
Washington County.

This appeal was taken to the Supreme Court

ostensibly under the authority of Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (j)
and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
appeal been taken by a proper party, the
jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Court

Had the

would

have

However, the only appeal filed

in this matter is by Richard L. Hunt as Personal Representative
of the Estate of the decedent, in his representative capacity;
no one has filed an appeal in an individual capacity.

The

personal representative is not a party aggrieved by the order
entered by the District Court; the Appellant therefore lacks
standing to appeal, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed
because there is no justiciable controversy.
ISSUES
A.

PRESENTED

FOR

REVIEW

Does Richard L. Hunt as Personal Representative have

standing to make this appeal?

Specific

issues

include the

following:
1.

Since the Order does not affect the estate or

the personal representative in his representative capacity,
is the personal representative aggrieved by the Order?
2.

Can an appeal properly be taken by a person not

aggrieved by an order?
3.

Where

an appeal

is taken by a person

in the

capacity of a personal representative and the appellant
subsequently resigns as personal representative, can the
Page 1

appellant thereafter prosecute the appeal in an individual
capacity?
4.

Is this Court without jurisdiction when there is

no justiciable controversy?
[Standard of review does not apply to the above issues]
B.

If the Court addresses the merits of this case, the

following

issue will be presented:

correctly

determine

that

the

Did the District

entire

decedent's heirs at law, the Appellees?

estate

passes

Court
to

the

Specific issues include

the following:
1.

Do the actual words used in the Will dispose of

any assets of the estate to anyone?
2.

Is any gift by implication required under the

terms of the Will?
3.
at

law

Does the entire estate pass to decedent's heirs
by

intestate

succession,

notwithstanding

the

disinheritance clause contained in the Will?
4.

Are the decedent's

nephew and two nieces his

heirs?
[The Standard of Review for these issues is discussed below.]
C.

Should

frivolous appeal?

sanctions

be

imposed

on Hunt

for taking a

[Standard of review does not apply]
STANDARD

OF

REVIEW

Hunt contends that the District Court abused its discretion
(Brief of Appellant, pp. 5, 9).
this case reviewed under the
adopted by Hunt.
Page 2

The Heirs are content to have

"abuse of discretion"

standard

The test for abuse of discretion is whether

the

trial

court

conscientious

acted

judgment,

arbitrarily,

without

or

the

exceeded

P.2d 219, 222 Mont. 446 (1986); Gakiya

v.

722 P.2d 460, 68 Haw. 550 (1986).

abused when the

judicial action

bounds

See Goodman v.

resulting in substantial injustice.

Inc.,

employment

Hallmark

of

of

reason,

Goodman,

723

Properties,

Judicial discretion is

is arbitrary,

fanciful, or

unreasonable., i.e., only where no reasonable person would take
Ruebke

the view adopted by the trial court.
Corp.,

241 Kan. 595, 738 P.2d 1246 (1987).

the case here.

v.

Globe

Comm.

That clearly is not

Appellant cannot establish that the District

Court abused its discretion.
However, under Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it
appears that the standard of review should be "clear error"
rather than "abuse of discretion."

Rule 52(a) states in part

that "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. . .
."

The "clearly erroneous" standard is well established and

oft-repeated.

Under that standard, the trial court's finding of

fact will be reversed "only if, after marshalling all relevant
evidence from the record, the appellant demonstrates that the
finding was clearly erroneous."
(Utah App. 1989), citing Cornish
922 (Utah 1988).

Fife

v.

Fife,

Town v.

111 P.2d 512, 513

Roller,

758 P.2d 919,

Even where the evidence is entirely in written

form, the standard of review is whether the findings of fact are
"clearly erroneous."

Rule 52(a) specifically refers to findings

based on documentary evidence as being subject to this standard.
See also Deer

Creek,

Inc.

v. Clarendon

Hot Springs

Ranch,

Inc.,
Page 3

688 P.2d 1191 (Idaho App. 1984); Treasure Valley
Heating,

Inc.

v.

Earth

(Idaho App. 1988).

Resources

Company,

Inc.,

Plumbing

and

7 66 P. 2d 1254

It is appropriate to give deference to the

trial court's analysis of the documentary evidence considered in
light of arguments presented to that court.
However, the Heirs also recognize that in some instances
where the evidence consists entirely of documentary

evidence

that is also before the appellate court, and where the demeanor
of witnesses

or conflicting

testimony

is not

involved,

the

appellate court may substitute its own judgment for that of the
See Lake

trial court.

(Utah 1976); Matter

v.

of

Hermes

Adoption

916, 918 (Utah App. 1988).

Associates,
of

Infant

552 P.2d 126, 128
Anonymous,

760 P.2d

Even if that standard applies, the

Heirs submit that an independent evaluation by this Court will
reach the same findings and conclusions as were found by the
District Court.
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness without any
special deference.

Western

1 v.

Co.,

Jackson

Cattle

the conclusions
error" standard.
T.R.F.

v.

STATUTES

Felan,
AND

Kane

County

Special

Serv.

744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987).

Dist.

Therefore,

of law are reviewed under a "correction
Bailey

v.

Call,

No.

of

767 P.2d 138 (Utah App. 1989).

760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988).
RULES

WHOSE

INTERPRETATION

IS

DETERMINATIVE

The texts of the following statutes and rules are set forth
in the Addendum:
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(3)

Page 4

Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(17)
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(21)
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(28)
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-101
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-103(1)(c)
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-603
Utah Code Annotated §75-3-101
Rule 33, Utah R. App. P.
Rule 33(a), R. Utah S. Ct.
Rule 40, R. Utah S. Ct.
Rule 52 (a), R. C. P.
STATEMENT

OF

Nature of the Case,
Disposition Below
This

appeal

is

from

THE

Course
an

Order

CASE
of

Proceedings,

Construing

and

Will

and

Determining Heirs, a final order of the Fifth District Court for
Washington County.
decedent's

Will

representative

This case involves the interpretation of a
in

a

and the

probate
heirs

proceeding.

at

law of the

The

personal

decedent

filed

separate petitions for interpretation or construction of the
decedent's Will in order to determine the beneficiaries entitled
to inherit the decedent!s estate
After

a hearing

and the

[Record, pp. 15-17, 31-35].

filing of memoranda

of points and

authorities, the District Court issued an Order Construing Will
and Determining Heirs [Record, pp. 69-72].

The Order determined

that the decedent's Will failed to dispose of any assets, that
the

entire

estate

therefore

passed

by

intestacy

to

the

Page 5

decedent's heirs at law, and that the heirs at law are the
nieces and nephew of the decedent.

The personal representative

filed this appeal from that Order [Record, pp. 73-74].
Statement

of

Facts

Reed Dwane Hunt died on December 3, 1988, a resident of
Washington County, Utah
children, was unmarried

[Record, p. 1] .

The decedent had no

at the time of his

death, and his

parents predeceased him [Findings of Fact, 5 B,(Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law contained in the Order--see copy of the
Order in Addendum].

Decedent had four stepchildren, Richard L.

Hunt, Dennis Rae Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, and Denice Marie
[Findings of Fact, 1 E] .

Hunt

adopted by decedent

The stepchildren

[Findings of Fact, 1 E] .

were never

The decedent's

nearest relatives and heirs at law are his nephew and two nieces
(children of his only sibling, a deceased sister with whom he
had

resided prior

to her death)

Conclusions of Law, 5 F] .

[Findings

of Fact, 1

C-D;

These nieces and nephew are the

Appellees.
The day before decedent died, he signed a pre-printed form
Will

with

typewritten

Addendum].

entries

[see

copy

The Will has no disposition

of

the

clause.

Will

in

The first

paragraph identifies the decedent and revokes all prior Wills.
The second paragraph declares that the decedent is a single man,
that

he has

four

stepchildren,

names the

stepchildren,

and

states that if any person establishes that he is a child of the
decedent, the child will receive five dollars and no more.

The

third paragraph is a disinheritance clause giving one dollar to

Page 6

any person determined to be an heir.
Richard

L.

Hunt

(one

of

the

The final paragraph names

stepchildren)

as

Personal

Representative, waives bond, and grants a power of sale [see
copy of the Will in Addendum].
Richard L. Hunt filed an Application for Informal Probate
of Will and Informal Appointment of Personal Representative, on
January

10,

1989

[Record,

pp.

1-3].

Paragraph

4 of

the

Application incorrectly declares under oath that the heirs and
devisees of the decedent are the stepchildren; no mention of the
true heirs at law if given in the Application [Record, pp. 1-2].
Richard

L.

Hunt

was

appointed

Personal

February 6, 1989 [Record, pp. 11-12].

Representative

on

On April 8, 1989, Richard

L. Hunt filed a Petition for Interpretation of Last Will and
Testament, by which he requested the Court to enter an order
declaring

that

the

entire

[Record, pp. 15-17].

estate

pass

to

the

stepchildren

Paragraph 3 of the Petition incorrectly

states under oath that the heirs of the decedent under the
intestate succession laws "would be surviving uncles and aunts."
[Record, p. 15].

At the hearing, the hearing on the Petition

was continued without date (the minute entry incorrectly states
that three of the heirs were present; those present were three
of the stepchildren, not heirs)
neither

the

Application

for

[Record, p. 23].

Probate

nor

the

Notice of

Petition

for

Interpretation of Last Will and Testament were given to any of
the

decedent's

Withdrawal

heirs

of Attorney

[Record,

pp.

5,

19].

On May

15, a

was filed by Phillip L. Foremaster,

counsel for the personal representative

[Record, p. 29],

The

Page 7

withdrawing

attorney

stated

"I have been unable to get the

personal representative to cooperate with me in preparing and
filing an inventory and appraisement nor have I been able to get
him to agree with me on a course of action in the probate to
properly

settle the estate.

As a result

I feel

recourse except to file my withdrawal of attorney."

I have no
[Record, p.

30] .
On June 13, 1989, one of the nieces filed a "Petition for
Construction of Will; Adjudication of Intestacy for Disposition
of Estate; Determination

of Heirs; and Removal

of

Personal

Representative and Formal Appointment of Special Administrator
or Successor Personal Representative, or in the alternative, for
Bond and Supervised Administration"

[Record, pp. 31-35]

At a

hearing held July 11, 1989, the court ordered that the personal
representative be restrained from disposing of any assets of the
estate, and counsel for the personal representative stated that
an inventory and appraisement would be filed
Following

the

hearing

and

the

subsequent

[Record, p. 49].
submission

of

supplemental and responsive memoranda of points and authorities,
the

District

Court

on

September

6,

1989, entered

an

Order

Construing Will and Determining Heirs, which includes Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. [Record, pp. 69-72; see copy of
the Order in Addendum] .

By the Order, the stepchildren take

nothing and the entire estate passes by intestacy to the nieces
and nephew

(the Appellees) as decedent's heirs

Law, 1 A-G; Order, 1 1-2].

Page 8

[Conclusions of

A Notice of Appeal was filed by "Richard L. Hunt, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Reed Dwane Hunt" on October 6,
1989

[Record, pp. 73-74; see copy of the Notice of Appeal in

Addendum].

No appeal has been taken by any of the stepchildren

in their individual capacities or by any other person.
At the hearing of the Petition for Removal of Richard L.
Hunt as Personal Representative held November 9, 1989, Richard
L. Hunt resigned as personal representative [Record, pp. 83-84].
The personal representative was ordered to submit an Inventory
and Appraisement for the estate and a first and final accounting
for

his

tenure

as

December 8, 1989

personal

representative,

[Record, pp. 83, 86].

no

later

than

As of May 7, 1990,

Richard L. Hunt has still failed to comply with the court order
to file an Inventory and Appraisement and a first and final
accounting.
In this Brief, the Appellant

(Richard L. Hunt, Personal

Representative of the Estate of Reed Dwane Hunt) is sometimes
referred to as "Hunt."

Appellees are sometimes referred to as

"the Heirs."
SUMMARY

OF

ARGUMENTS

Only a person aggrieved by a district court's order may
appeal the order.

A personal representative is not aggrieved by

an order determining heirs or interpreting a Will, since such an
order

affects

only

the

beneficiaries

or

themselves; the estate and the fiduciary's
affected.

claimants

between

capacity are not

Hunt improperly appealed in the capacity of personal

representative.

No one appealed in an individual

capacity.

Page 9

Hunt subsequently resigned as personal representative, but has
continued to prosecute this appeal.

His resignation bars his

right to prosecute the appeal, even if the appeal had been
properly taken.
lack

of

a

Hunt lacks standing to appeal.

justiciable

controversy

divests

jurisdiction and requires summary affirmance.

Therefore, the
the

court

(POINT I)

The decedent's Will fails to dispose of any assets.
no dispositive clause.
mentions

no

of

It has

It states no intent to make a gift,

property

to

beneficiary of any gift.

be

given,

and

names

no

intended

A decedent's intent can be determined

only by the actual words of the Will.

A reading of this Will

compels but one reasonable conclusion:

the words of this Will

express no intent to devise assets to anyone.
fails the rigorous test for gifts by implication.

The Will also
(POINT II)

Since the Will disposes of no assets, the entire estate
passes to decedent's heirs at law by intestate succession.

The

disinheritance

the

statutory

clauses

rules

of

in

the

intestate

Will

do

not

succession;

supersede
heirs

can

be

disinherited only by a valid testamentary disposition of the
estate.

(POINT III)

Decedent's heirs are his nieces and nephew, the Appellees.
(POINT IV)
Hunt's appeal is frivolous and interposed for delay.
as personal representative

Hunt

is not a proper party to appeal.

Hunt has no reasonable factual or legal basis for this appeal.
Hunt's actions demonstrate his intent to use his position for
personal advantage, without notice to and in disregard of the
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rights of decedent's heirs.

This appeal has forced Respondents

to incur substantial expense and delay for no valid reason.
This is an appropriate case for the imposition of sanctions on
Hunt under Rule 33, Utah R. App. P.

(POINT V)
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ARGUMENT
I

THE APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED
REPRESENTATIVE
LACKS STANDING
ELSE APPEALED
A personal

representative

acting

BECAUSE THE PERSONAL
TO APPEAL AND NO ONE
in his

representative

capacity is an impartial stakeholder as between the conflicting
claims of heirs or devisees.
fiduciary

whose

beneficiaries.

duty

is

The personal representative is a
to

deal

impartially

with

all

He cannot participate in the adjudication of

conflicting claims of would-be beneficiaries or heirs.

After

the court construes a Will, determines heirs, or authorizes
distribution of assets, the role of the personal representative
is to carry out the order of the court.

Each beneficiary or

claimant must protect his or her own rights if affected by such
a court order.

The right to appeal belongs to the persons

aggrieved by such an order, such as the heirs or devisees.

A

personal representative is not entitled to appeal from an order
construing a Will since neither the estate nor the personal
representative can be aggrieved by the order.
A.

A Person
Appeal

Must

Be

Aggrieved

by

an

Order

To be a proper party to an appeal, "an

to

appellant

generally must show both that he or she was a party or privy to
the action below and that he or she is aggrieved by that court's

judgment."

Society

1166 (Utah 1987) .

Page 12

of Prof.
In

In

re

Journalists
Deseret

v.

Mortuary

Bullock,
Company,

743 P. 2d
78 Utah

393, 400-01, 3 P.2d 267

(1931), the Court ruled an appellant

must have a direct, pecuniary interest:
Not only must a party desiring to appeal have an
interest in the particular question litigated, but his
interest must be immediate and pecuniary . . . .
The damage or grievance . . . must be a direct
and positive one, effected by the judgment concluding
and acting upon his rights; and such damage must be by
the record, and not in consequence of it.
Persons
aggrieved in this sense, are not those who may happen
to entertain desires on the subject, but only those
who have rights which may be enforced at law, and
whose pecuniary interests might be established in
whole or in part by the decree.
This rule is a long-standing principle

adopted by

statute in many states and applied as common law in others.
example, in Ruidoso
395, 397

State

Bank

v.

Brumlow,

For

81 N.M. 379, 467 P.2d

(1970), the Supreme Court of New Mexico stated that

only an aggrieved party may appeal:
The right to appellate review of a judgment or order
exists only in one who is aggrieved or prejudiced
thereby. . . .
An aggrieved party . . .
is one having an
interest recognized by law in the subject matter which
is injuriously affected by the judgment, or one whose
property rights or personal interests are directly
affected by the operation of the judgment. . . .
Parties may appeal only if they have a real and
substantial interest in the subject matter before the
court, and are aggrieved or prejudiced by the
decision.
To be aggrieved, a party must have a
personal or pecuniary interest or property right
adversely affected by the judgment.
See also In

re

Estate

of

Griswold

13 Ariz. App. 218, 475 P. 2d

508, 511 (1970) .

B.

An
Order
Not
Affecting
the
Representative in His Representative
Cannot be Appealed by Him

Personal
Capacity
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"The great weight of authority is to the effect that
an executor or an administrator as such is not aggrieved or
prejudiced

by

a

decree

determining

the

beneficiaries, and hence may not appeal."
397 S.W.2d 595

(Mo. 1966)

rights

Re Estate

(emphasis added).

of
of

the
Fusz,

This is a long-

standing rule of wide application:
"The majority rule in the United States is that one in
a representative capacity cannot appeal from an order
or judgment in an action, in which he, in his
representative capacity, is a party, unless that order
or judgment adversely affects or prejudices the estate
which he is administering." In re Trustees
Under
Will
of Yost,
141 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ohio 1956).
"An executor or administrator as such is not an
aggrieved party where the judgment affects only the
rights of beneficiaries among themselves. . . . The
correctness of a determination that a certain person
is the decedent's sole heir is not a matter on which
the administrator can appeal." 4 Am. Jur. 2d, "Appeal
and Error," § 215, at 719-20.
In this case, the District Court entered an order
interpreting

the Will of the decedent and determining the heirs

who inherit by intestate succession since no assets are devised
by the Will.

It is proper for a personal representative to seek

interpretation of a Will by the court; however, once the court
makes

its decision, the only responsibility

representative

of the personal

was to carry out the order of the court.

A

personal representative is not affected in his administration of
the estate by the court's decision on which persons are entitled
to receive distribution

of estate assets.

In our case the

estate was neither endangered nor diminished by the Order.
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See

In re Trustees

Under

Will

of

Yost,

141 N . E . 2 d 176, 178-179

(Ohio

1956) .
Appellate

courts

routinely

dismiss

appeals

by

a

personal representative in this situation:
In order for an executor, administrator, or guardian
to appeal in their fiduciary capacity . . . the
judgment . . . appealed from must affect them in their
fiduciary
character.
. . .
Executors
and
administrators may not appeal where the judgment
appealed from affects only the rights of the
beneficiaries among themselves. . . .
The decree appealed from adjudicated the rights
of the litigants among themselves and was not against
the appellant in her representative
capacity;
therefore, appellant was not entitled to appeal.
House v. Roberts,
254 So.2d 904, 906, (Miss. 1971).
In

In

re

Lee's

Estate,

243 P.2d

1013, 1015 (Okla.

1952), the court dismissed a similar appeal by the personal
representative:
Since an administrator in his representative capacity
can never be a "party aggrieved" or "party interested"
in a decree which merely determines the heirs at law
of the estate for which he is administrator, he cannot
maintain in his representative capacity an appeal from
such decree. . . . When the court, after a proper
hearing, has determined the matter and designated the
persons who are entitled to receive the estate, as to
that phase of the proceeding the interest of the
administrator ceases.
In Shocket

v.

Silberman,

209 Va. 490, 165 S.E.2d 414

(1969), the court likewise dismissed the appeal of the personal
representative:
The executor is not aggrieved by the decree by which
he seeks an appeal. In his bill he merely asked for
the aid and guidance of the lower court in the
interpretation of the will and the decree complained
of gave him this relief. The interpretation in no way
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adversely
executor.

affected

the

In In re Ray's

estate

Estate,

represented

by

the

233 P.2d 393, 396 (Nev. 1951),

the court dismissed the personal representative's appeal of a
decree of distribution, noting that "the general rule is that an
administrator,
distribution
estate,

as

such,

cannot

determining

either

as

the persons

heirs

distributees under a Will"
Wash. 126, 79 P.2d 984).

appeal

at

law

of

(quoting In

In Desmond

v.

from

who

a

decree

of

should

receive

an

the
re

decedent

Maher's

Persina,

or

Estate,

as
195

381 A.2d 633,

637-38 (Me. 1978), the appellate court also agreed the order did
not infringe upon the representative's pecuniary or proprietary
interests, and since the representative must adopt a neutral
position respecting the conflicting claims of beneficiaries, the
representative must refrain from asserting appellate rights of
one claimant against another. The beneficiaries or claimants
must protect their own rights by appealing if they so desire.
In Estate

of

Evans,

704 P.2d 35

(Mont. 1985), the Court

held that a co-personal representative was not a party aggrieved
for purposes of appealing an order interpreting a Will:
a personal

representative may request the District

interpret the will

"While

Court to

. . . [she] has no standing to appeal the

resulting court order.

Because she is not a residuary devisee,

she has no interest adversely affected by the order."

Id.

at

40.
Even where the personal representative is one of the
heirs or devisees, any appeal by the personal representative in
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a

representative

capacity

will

be

dismissed.

A

personal

representative breaches fiduciary duties when he or she attempts
to maintain or prosecute a contested personal claim as heir or
devisee at the expense of the estate.

An appeal may properly be

taken only by the interested person in his or her individual
In Dockray

capacity.

v.

O'Leary,

286 Mass. 589, 190 N.E. 798

(1934), the court determined that the executor had no further
interest in the outcome of the action except to abide by and
carry out the instruction of the court in distribution of the
estate;

where

appealing

he

did

not

assert

his personal

interest

by

in his individual capacity, he had no interest as

executor that would make him in his official capacity a person
aggrieved.
Estate

of

See House
Ristman,

v.

Roberts,

254 So.2d 904 (Miss. 1977);
Estate of

300 P.2d 409 (Or. 1956);

11 Ariz. App. 555, 466 P.2d 774 (1970);
Cal. 2d 712, 62 P.2d 374
252, 252 P. 1039 (1927);

(1936);
In re Estate

Re Murphey's

Re Babb

Estate,

Estate's,

of Marrey,

McCabe,
7

200 Cal.

65 Cal. 287, 3

P. 896 (1884).
C.

Hunt's
Subsequent
Resignation
as
Representative
Bars
His
Prosecution
Appeal

Personal
of
the

The Notice of Appeal denominates Appellant as "Richard
L. Hunt, Personal Representative of the Estate of Reed Dwane
Hunt."

It has

already

been

demonstrated

that

a

personal

representative cannot properly appeal in this situation.

In

addition, Hunt resigned as personal representative on November
9, 1989, and is no longer functioning in that capacity.

Since
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he is no longer the personal representative, he has no right to
perpetuate this appeal in that capacity.

For this appeal to be

prosecuted, it would be necessary for the successor personal
representative to be substituted as the appellant.
been done.

Richard L. Hunt as an individual

This has not
is a separate

entity from Richard L. Hunt as personal representative.

Richard

L. Hunt as an individual filed no notice of appeal.
Further, the Docketing Statement and the Brief of Appellant
were

filed

by

Hunt

as

personal

representative

after

his

resignation as personal representative, and therefore after his
authority to do so had expired.

Respondents request that the

Docketing Statement and Brief of Appellant be stricken.

Since

Hunt is no longer personal representative and cannot prosecute
the appeal in the capacity of personal representative, summary
affirmance should be ordered.

Richard L. Hunt as an individual

did not file a notice of appeal and is not a party to this
appeal, yet

he is attempting to prosecute the appeal.

The

party to an appeal cannot be allowed to change without making
application to the court or without leave of court, yet that is
what Richard L. Hunt is attempting to do in this situation in
order to circumvent his error in failing to file a notice of
appeal as an individual.
D.

This is impermissible.

Since
Richard
L.
Hunt
as
Personal
Representative Has No Standing to Appeal, the
Lack of a Justiciable Controversy Divests the
Court of Jurisdiction
"The right to appeal and whether an appellant is a

party aggrieved . . . are jurisdictional questions which may be
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raised at any time and by the court itself, Love
Re Estate

Mo. 640, 154 S.W.2d 759, 760."
595

(Mo. 1966).

Lack

of

jurisdiction

v.

White,

of

Fusz, 397 S.W.2d

at

any

stage

proceeding is always subject to scrutiny by the courts.
v.

Persina,

348

381 A.2d 633, 638 (Me. 1978).

of a

Desmond

"The appellant must

demonstrate the existence of a justiciable controversy .
which we have defined as
sufficiently
protection.In

'a claim of right buttressed by a

substantial

interest

to

warrant

judicial

Id.

Even though the personal representative participated
in the hearing at the District Court level and was entitled to
seek instructions of the Court regarding interpretation of the
Will, the personal representative
right

to

appeal

in the

aggrieved by the Order.
1015 (Okla. 1952); In

re

176, 178-79 (Ohio 1956).

absence

did not thereby acquire a
of

a

See In re Lee's
Trustee

under

showing
Estate,

Yost's

that

he

was

243 P.2d 1013,
Will,

141 N.E.2d

Here, Hunt lacks standing to appeal;

therefore, there is no justiciable controversy, and this Court
lacks jurisdiction to proceed.
p. 4) that the decedent's
aggrieved by the Order.
cannot be

represented

Hunt admits (Appellant's Brief,

stepchildren are the real parties

However, the stepchildren are not and
on this appeal by Hunt; none of the

stepchildren has filed a notice of appeal or taken any other
step

to

perfect

the

appeal.

The

filing

by

Hunt

was

unequivocally done in his capacity as personal representative,
not in an individual capacity.
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This

Court

must

dismiss

the

appeal

or

grant

summary

affirmance.
II.

THE

DECEDENT'S

WILL

The District Court
disposition
conclusion

of
that

succession.

FAILS

DISPOSE

OF ANY

ASSETS

found that Decedent's Will makes no

assets.
the

TO

This

finding

estate passes

by

is
the

critical
law of

to

the

intestate

The testator is presumed to intend the effect of

the terms of his Will.

Therefore the decedent

intended the

distribution of his estate according to the rules of intestate
succession, because he made no attempt whatsoever to dispose of
any assets.

No individual is identified as a beneficiary, and

no property is identified as an asset to be disposed of under
the Will.
A.

The Testator's
the Meaning of
Will

Intent is
the Words

to be Determined by
Actually Used in the

Hunt inaccurately claims support from U.C.A. § 75-2603, which states that "the intention of a testator as expressed
in his will controls the legal effect of his dispositions."
This principle does not mean the Court may add language to the
Will under the guise of construction.
the language in the Will.

The Court is limited to

A court determines the intention of

the testator by interpreting a Will from the language actually
used in the Will:
The testator's intention regarding the beneficiary of
the residue, is to be ascertained from the words of
the will . . . .
The purpose of construction as
applied to wills is unquestionably to arrive, if
possible, at the intention of the testator; but the
intention to be sought for is not that which existed
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in the mind of the testator, but that which is
expressed in the language of the will. It is not the
business of the court to say, in examining the terms
of the will, what the testator intended, but what is
the meaning to be given to the language which he used.
Estate
of DeMoulin,
225 P.2d 303, 306 (Cal. 1951)
(emphasis added).
In Estate

of

Deacon,

342

P.

2d

decedent's Will contained no residuary clause.

261

(1959),

the

The court noted

that the testatrix's intention is derived from the words used:
This court cannot write words into a will that
are not fairly and reasonably contained therein.
It may well be that the testatrix had some
intention other than that set forth in the will.
It is reasonable to believe that she had in mind
putting in a general residuary clause but, if
so, she did not disclose that intention to us. .
. . Courts are not to look for 'some undeclared
purpose which m^y be imagined to fre in 'his miftdr
but the intention disclosed by the words he has
US£d.' Xd. at 264 (emphasis added).
As a result, the residue passed by intestacy.
was reached in Estate of

Corwin,

The same result

383 P. 2d 339, 342 (Ida. 1963)

where the court distinguished between construction of terms and
supplying terms:
Courts cannot soeculate as to what was in the
mind of the testator, what he intended to do. or
what he intended to declare in his Will, but our
task herein is to determine what was meant by
what the testatrix did declare in her will bv
the words she actually u s e d tJtLe r e i n •
[citations].
Presumptions and auxiliary rules
applicable
to
probate
matters
are
all
subordinate
to
the
cardinal
rule
just
enunciated. [citations] (emphasis added).
In our case, the District

Court's decision to refrain

from

supplying terms must be affirmed.
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B .

A Will Is Never Open to Construction Merely
Avoid Intestacy or Because the Will Fails
Dispose of the Entire Estate
Courts favor testacy rather than intestacy.

to
to

A Will

evidencing an intention to dispose of the entire estate should
be interpreted, if possible, in such a manner as to prevent
intestacy.

Hunt relies on these maxims, but that reliance is

misplaced.

These rules apply only when the actual language used

in the Will is ambiguous and it is necessary to construe that
language.

In our case, the Will is somewhat unusual in that it

makes no disposition of assets, but the actual language of the
Will

is unambiguous.

language

of

construction.

the

Will

There
which

is no ambiguity
requires

in the

resort

to

actual

rules

of

In addition, Utah statutes specifically recognize

that a Will may not dispose of the assets of the estate, and
these statutes therefore provide for the estate not disposed of
by the Will to vest in and pass to the heirs.

See U.C.A. §§75-

2-101 and 75-3-101.
Extrinsic evidence may be used if there is an imperfect
description of the subject matter of the gift or an ambiguity as
to the identity of a beneficiary, such as where a brother and a
nephew have the same name, and only the name is given in the
Will.

But neither extrinsic evidence nor construction can be

used to supply missing dispositive language in a Will.
example, in the Will in Estate

of

DeMoulin,

For

225 P. 2d 303, 306

(Cal. 1951), there was "a total failure to name or describe a
beneficiary of the residue."
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The court therefore allowed the

residue to pass by intestacy.

The same is true in our case:

no

one is designated as a beneficiary, and no gift of property is
made.
Matter

of

Estate

of

Lewis,

738 P.2d

617

(Utah 1987), a

unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice Hall, disposes of
this issue.

In that case, the testator's holographic Will named

his wife, Rhoda, and directed the personal representative to
"insure for her comfort, security and her fair portion."
618.

Id.

at

The district court found that the Will failed to dispose

of the testator's assets and ordered distribution of the estate
to

the

testator's

heirs.

(decedent's wife) in Lewis

As

in

case,

the

appellant

argued for an interpretation of the

Will that would prevent intestacy.
arguments

our

on appeal, claiming that

The wife made a number of
she was entitled to the

entire estate, a power of appointment, a share equal to the
widow's intestate share, or the "bulk" of the estate.
Court

concluded

that

the

language

of

the

Will

was

This
merely

precatory in nature, stating:
This conclusion is not in conflict with the probate
code.
The presumption against intestacy used when
construing testamentary instruments is based upon the
assumption that by executing a will, the testator
intended for his property to pass testate. To this
end, a will first and foremost must be construed
according to the intent of the testator as expressed
from the words of the will and circumstances under
which it was executed. In this case, testator's will
merely expressed his intent that his wife be properly
cared for, but did not dispose of any property or
create any power of appointment. Id. at 620 (emphasis
added).
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In Lewis,

this Court agreed with the fundamental principle that

the intent of the testator is controlling, but determined that
the testator's intention could in no way be determined from the
face of the Will; the Court therefore refused to speculate as
to the testator's intention.
portion

of the will

is too

Id.

at 621.

indefinite

"The dispositive

to be

construed

leaving any definite portion of the estate to appellant."
at 622.

as
Id.

The estate therefore passed by intestacy.

The law of other states and common law agree that a Will
does not require construction because it fails to dispose of the
decedent's assets:
To say that because a will does not dispose of all of
the testator's property it is ambiguous and must be
construed so as to prevent intestacy, either total or
partial, is to use a rule of construction as the
reason for construction. But a will is never open to
construction merely because it does not dispose of all
of the testator's property. 'Courts are not permitted
in order to avoid a conclusion of intestacy to adopt a
construction based on conjecture as to what the
testator may have intended, although not expressed.'
Estate of Beldon,
11 Cal. 2d 108, 112, 77 P.2d 1052,
1054 (1938); Estate
of DeMoulin,
225 P.2d 303, 306
(Cal. 1950).
After noting the general rule favoring testacy over intestacy,
the Supreme Court of Idaho stated:
However, in order to avoid intestacy, either partial
or complete, the court is not permitted to put on the
will any construction not expressed in it, and which
is based on supposition as to the intention of the
testator in the disposition of his estate. Estate
of
Corwin, 383 P. 2d 339, 341 (Ida. 1963).
In Estate
659

of Barnes,

47 Cal. Rptr. 480, 407 P.2d 656,

(Cal. 1965), the court acknowledged the rule that a will
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should be construed according to the intention of the testator
and

so as

to

avoid

intestacy,

but

the

court

nevertheless

concluded that the property must pass by intestacy since "a,
court may not write a will which the testator did not write"
(emphasis added).

The court concluded that "any selection by

the courts now would be to indulge in forbidden conjecture" and

that the declared intention of the testatrix to dispose of all
her property "does not authorize the courts under the auise of
construction to supply dispositive
will. " Id.

lacking

from the

(emphasis added).

The Court in Estate
1963),

clauses

of

Corwin,

likewise concluded that

383 P.2d 339, 342

(Ida.

"Courts are not permitted in

order to avoid a conclusion of intestacy to adopt a construction
based on conjecture as to what the testator may have intended,
although not expressed, [citations]"
Finally,

the preference

for

constructions

which

avoid

intestacy is no stronger than the rule preferring heirs over
non-heirs, as the eminent author of a treatise on Wills has
stated:
The presumption against intestacy is of no greater
force than the presumption in favor of the heir. . .
It is always held by the court where the Will is
equally susceptible of two constructions, one in favor
of the heirs and the other in favor of some more
distant relative, that the one in favor of the heir
will be preferred. In construing a will, the courts,
in case of doubt, lean toward a construction which
conforms as nearly as possible to the statutes of
descent and distribution. 2 Page, A Treatise
on the
Law of Wills
(Third [Lifetime] Edition), p. 855
(emphasis added).
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This rule would prefer the Heirs over the stepchildren even if
construction of the Will were necessary.
C.

The Words Used
No
Intention
Stepchildren or

in Our Decedent's Will Express
that
Assets
Pass
to
the
to Anyone Else

Courts interpreting a Will search for the reasonable
meaning of the words

which the testator has actually

used.

Here, the words used by the testator do not dispose of his
estate to anyone.

No words

in the Will can reasonably

construed as a disposition of the estate in any manner.

be
The

rule of law is fixed:
In construing a will the court has no power to make a
will for the testator or to attempt to improve upon
the will which the testator actually made. The court
cannot begin by inferring testator's intention and
then construe the will so as to give effect to this
intention, however probable it may be; nor can it
rewrite the will, in whole or in part, to conform to
such presumed intention." 2 Page, Treatise
on the Law
of Wills
(Third [Lifetime] Edition) pp. 812-814.
The

Brief

of

Appellant

is

essentially

unsupported

assertions that the Will "clearly" disposes of the estate to the
stepchildren.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

In

fact, a reading of the actual language of the Will reveals in
brilliant clarity that the Will disposes of no assets.
is made in the Will.

No gift

No words of grant are contained in it.

There is no bequest, no devise, no transfer of any particular
asset

to any beneficiary.

There are no gifts

effects or other specific items.

personal

There is no residuary clause.

There is emphatically no gift whatsoever.
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of

To

constitute

a valid

disposition

under

a Will,

the

testator must (1) intend to make a gift, (2) indicate to whom
the gift is to be made, and
given.

(3) specify the property to be

Even a cursory reading of the Will establishes that

none of these three necessary elements are present in our case:
the testator makes no statement of intent to make a gift, no
designation of any individual as a beneficiary of a gift, and
no specification of any property that is to be given.

Hunt

fails to meet any of the three elements logically required for
an effective gift.
Once again, Matter

of Estate

of

Lewis,

738 P.2d 617 (Utah

1987)

(discussed above) disposes of Hunt's argument

case.

The Will in Lewis

beneficiary,

specifically identified the intended

testator's

wife

Rhoda,

as

the

bounty.

The testator

expressly

wanted to

comfort,

security

her

portion."

testator

both

wanted

to

and

identified

make

in our

fair

a beneficiary

provision

for

her.

object
"insure

of

his

for her

Therefore,

and

the

stated that he

Nevertheless,

no

distribution could properly be made under the Will because the
dispositive provision was too indefinite.

The facts in

Lewis

are much stronger for the claimant there than the facts in our
case.

In our case, there is not even an expressed intent that

a beneficiary be properly cared for, as there was in

Lewis.

The Will does not designate anyone as a beneficiary, and is
absolutely silent as to a direction to provide any asset or
benefit to anyone.
from the words

No intention to make a gift can be drawn

in the Will,

and the Court must

refuse to
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speculate as to the testator's

intention, as it refused in

Lewis.
Through tortuous reasoning, Hunt attempts to extract from
the standard disinheritance clause in paragraph Third of the
Will,

some

mandate

for

making

a

distribution

to

the

stepchildren.

Hunt's argument has no basis in fact or law.

Hunt

ad

repeats

nauseam

throughout

his

Brief

that

the

disinheritance clause excludes from participation in the estate
everyone except the stepchildren.
Hunt's

frequent

repetition

This simply is not true, and

does

not

make

it

so.

The

disinheritance clause in paragraph Third expressly disinherits
"any

and

all

specifically

of

my

heirs

mentioned

and

herein"

next
and

of

kin

"any

who

and

are

all

not

persons

whomsoever claiming to be or who may be lawfully determined to
be my heirs at law, except as otherwise mentioned in this Will."
This is standard disinheritance language, found as boilerplate
in many Wills.

It disinherits those who might claim to be the

heirs at law of the decedent.

The reference to those "otherwise

mentioned in this Will" refers only to heirs who are otherwise
mentioned.

By

definition,

that

cannot

refer

stepchildren, since stepchildren are not heirs
Point

IV.A. below).

The

disinheritance

to

the

(see Argument

clause

is

standard

language disinheriting heirs. A testator who uses a legal term
is presumed to use the word in its legal sense.
Ricklefs's
Lee,

Estate,

211 Kan. 713, 508 P.2d 866 (1973); Jackson

193 Kan. 40, 392 P.2d 92 (1964); Erickson

Wash.App.
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See In

407, 493

P.2d

794

(1972).

An

v.
heir

Reinbold,

Re
v.
6

is a person

entitled
include

to

inherit

by

stepchildren.

intestate

succession,

and

does

Therefore, the disinheritance

makes no reference at all to the stepchildren.
a gnat and swallows a camel.

not

clause

Hunt strains out

There is no justification for the

construction of the Will proposed by Hunt.

Also, Hunt claims

(Brief of Appellant, pp. 3, 5) that the Will refers to the
stepchildren
misreads

as the decedent's heirs and next

the

Will,

since

nowhere

does

it

of kin; Hunt
refer

to

the

stepchildren as heirs or next of kin.
Further, the specific naming of the stepchildren appears to
be

an

attempt

to

disinherit

them,

not

to

benefit

them.

Paragraph Second of the Will states as follows:
Second: I declare that I am a single man, and that I
have four (4) step-childern [sic] . Richard L Hunt,
Delbert Douglas Hunt, Denise Marie Buckley, and Dennis
Ray Hunt.
If, at any time, any person shall be
established by a Court of Law to be a child of mine,
then I give and bequeath to each such person the sum
of Five Dollars ($5.00) and no more.
The specific naming of the stepchildren and then following their
names with a statement disinheriting any person established by a
court to be a child of the decedent, appears to be designed to
pre-empt any attempt by the stepchildren to claim to be actual
children of the decedent.

Apparently fearing that one of the

stepchildren might, after his death, assert a fraudulent claim
to

be

a

child,

the

decedent

specifically

named

them

and

disinherited them should they attempt to do so.
Hunt asserts that the District Court failed to make any
findings on the intention of testator (Brief of Appellant, pp. 3-
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4).

Findings of fact must be construed liberally and in favor

of the judgment.
As noted above, the "intent" the court looks for is not the
subjective intent of the testator, but the intent expressed by
his Will.

The result achieved by the Will is included in the

court's findings, and constitutes the intent of the testator;
the testator is presumed to intend the consequences of his Will.
The District

Court

specifically

found that the Will of the

decedent fails to dispose of any assets.
the

intention

of the

testator,

and

That is the finding of

it

is entitled

to

any

inferences (including inferred subordinate findings, if any) in
order to support

it.

The

finding

is sufficient

as it is.

However, even if a separate express finding were necessary, this
Court has the power to supply the finding since this Court has
the Will before it.
D.

The
Will
Implication

Does

Not

Evidence

Hunt claims the Will makes a gift by

a

Gift

by

implication.

Since courts endeavor to ascertain the intention of the testator
from the Will, on rare occasions property will be disposed of by
necessary implication when the Will taken cis a whole shows a
clear

intent to make a specific gift to a specific person.

However, for this to occur, the Will must inescapably reveal a
dominant dispositive plan for such a gift.

Gift by implication

is not favored:
The presumption is very strong, however, against [the
testator] having intended any devise or bequest which
he has not set forth in his will.
There must be a
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probability arising from the whole will that testator
intended to make the bequest or devise, which he has
not set forth expressly, so strong that it cannot be
supposed that any other intention existed in the mind
of testator.
This intention must appear from the
language which is used in the will.
The fact that
testator makes no specific provision . . . does not
justify the court in construing the will so as to make
a gift by implication. 2 Page, A Treatise
on the Law
of Wills,
(Third [Lifetime] Edition) pp.861-862.
For example, in Brock

v.

Hall,

206 P.2d 360

(Cal.), the

decedent's trust divided his estate between his two children,
providing for disposition of the estate in the event of various
contingencies

relating

to

the possible

offspring, or death of the children.
to cover the

actual

contingency

marriage, birth

of

However, the trust failed

which

eventually

occurred.

Nevertheless, because the trust explicitly made gifts to the
children

and provided

possible

situations,

for a substitutional
the

court

concluded

gift
that

in several
it

was

the

decedent's intention for the entire estate to go to one child
when the other child died without issue or spouse.
The trust in Brock

contained a clear "dominant dispositive

plan" whereby "the probability that the trustor intended to make
a gift

in this contingency

is so strong

existence of any other possible intent."
added).

as to nullify the
Id.

at 365 (emphasis

That is a very different situation than the Will we are

now considering, which not only has no "dominant dispositive
plan"--it

has no disposition

at all.

This

Court must ask

itself, "Does the language of this Will imply a gift to the
stepchildren

so strongly as to nullify the existence of any

other possible intent?"

There is but one reasonable conclusion:
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the answer must be

"No."

There

is no

implication

of gift

whatsoever.
No dominant dispositive plan can be derived from the
decedent's Will in this case, since there is no disposition of
any assets to anyone.

There is no gift by implication from the

mere fact that the stepchildren are identified in the Will; the
naming of the stepchildren seems to be an attempt to disinherit
them from any attempt on their part to claim to be children of
the decedent.

There is certainly no dominant dispositive plan

in the Will manifesting an intent to dispose of the estate to
the stepchildren.

This is fanciful conjecture on Hunt's part,

but much more than mere conjecture is necessary:
"To warrant the court in so declaring [a gift by
implication] there must be something more than
conjecture. The probability of an intention to make
the gift implied must appear to be so strong that an
intention contrary to that imputed to the testator
cannot be supposed to have existed in his mind." This
is a rule frequently since reiterated and applied.
Estate
of Ottoveggio,
145 P.2d 700, 702 (Cal. App.
1944), quoting In Re Estate
of Franckr
190 Cal. 28,
31-32, 210 P. 417, 418.
In his brief, Hunt cites two cases for the proposition that
a gift by implication is appropriate.
First

Nat'l

Bank

v.

Tingley,

Seattle-

In one of these,

22 Wash.App. 258, 589 P.2d

(1978), the court actually found no. gift by implication.
quoted the
decision

court

supported

(Brief of Appellant, p.
his position, but

8) as though

failed

to

include

following underlined language:
Gifts

by

disfavored,
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implication

in

wills

generally

are

They are not allowed on the basis of.

811
Hunt
the
the

conjecture or mere silence in a will; the proponent
must show that the testator had a manifest and plain
intent to create the gift, but that he failed to
express himself as distinctly as he should have. The
showing of intent must be so strong that a contrary
intent cannot be supposed to have existed in the
testatorfs mind. Id. at 814.
The court concluded that the record fell far short of showing
the

manifest

and

plain

intention

necessary

for

a gift

by

implication.
The other case cited by Hunt is readily distinguishable.
In In Re Will

of McDowell,

81 N.M. 562, 469 P.2d 711 (1970), the

joint and mutual Will had specific dispositive provisions.

On

the husband's death, the Will established a testamentary trust
with a life estate for his wife and a remainder to nieces and
nephews.

On the wife's subsequent death, the Will provided for

a life estate to her husband if he survived, and on his death
for the funds to be distributed to the trust established by him;
however, she survived her husband, and the Will contained no
express provision for disposition of the estate if her husband
failed

to

dispositive

survive.
plan

Nevertheless,

contained

because

of

in the testamentary

the

clear

trust

for a

remainder interest to vest in nieces and nephews, the court
found that a gift to the nieces and nephews was intended.

The

court concluded that from the plan of the joint and mutual Will
and

the

language

of

the

Will

inescapable" that both testators

itself,

the

"conclusion

intended that the

is

survivor

should have a life estate in the property with the remainder to
go to the nieces and nephews.

Id.

at 713.

That is a very
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different case from that which we are facing here, where the
Will makes no disposition whatsoever.
Here, only by guess, whim, or conjectures can a gift to the
stepchildren be inferred.

The probability that the decedent

intended to make a gift to the stepchildren is not only not so
strong that it cannot be supposed to have existed in his mind,
it is nonexistent.
III.

THE ENTIRE ESTATE
INTESTATE
SUCCESSION

PASSES

TO

DECEDENT'S

HEIRS

BY

The entire estate in this case passes to the heirs at law
because the law provides for such a disposition in the absence
of a valid testamentary devise.

The disinheritance clause in

the Will cannot affect heirs at law.
A.

Assets Not Disposed of by a Will
Laws of Intestate Succession

Pass Under

the

The Will of Reed Dwane Hunt fails to dispose of any of
his property.

Utah Code Annotated § 75-2-101 mandates that "Any

part of the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed of by
his Will passes to his heirs."

This is a long-standing rule of

law and is universally accepted.
One who leaves a portion of his estate undisposed of
by his Will is presumed to know that the undistributed portion
will pass under the statutory rules of succession. Estate
Dunn,

260 P.2d 964 (Cal. App. 1953).

of

Further, the principles of

intestate succession are so straightforward that courts have
consistently ruled that assets not disposed of by a Will pass to
the heirs at law.
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See -Re Estate

of

Emma Brown,

106 N.W.2d 535

(Mich. 1960).
applicable

The doctrine of stare decisis is particularly

in the area of law pertaining to the descent of
In Re

propertyf where stability of the law has peculiar value.
McKay Estate,
B.

98 N.W.2d 604 (Mich. 1956).

The Testator Is Presumed
Effect of His Words

to

Intend

the

Legal

The province of the court in construing a Will is
subject to limitations, for valid policy reasons:
There are well-defined limits, beyond which the courts
have not gone and beyond which they could not go
without subverting all rules and leaving the
interpretation of every will to the mere caprice and
whim of the chancellor.
One of these rules, firmly
established
and never departed
from or even
criticized, is that the expressed intent will not be
varied under the guise of correction, because the
testator misapprehended its legal effect.
The

testator is presumed to know the law.

If the legal

effect of his expressed intent is intestacy, it will
be presumed that he designed that intent. The inquiry
will not go to the secret workings of the mind of the
testator.
It is not, what did he mean? but it is,
what do his words mean? Estate
of Mcllhattan,
224 N.
W. 713 (Wis.)(emphasis added).
"A court's inquiry in construing a will is limited to
ascertaining what the testator meant by the language which was
used.

Tf he used language which results in intestacy, and there

can be no doubt about the meaning of the language which was
used/ the court must hold that the intestacy was intended. "
Estate of Beldon,

11 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Cal.1938)(emphasis added).

This is the clear rule governing cases of this type.

"If the

will clearly discloses that the testator did not dispose of all
his property, particularly in the absence of a residuary clause,
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then the omitted property must descend according to the laws of
succession."
C.

Estate

of

Corwin,

A Disinheritance
Statutory
Right
Intestacy
The

provisions

383 P. 2d 393, 341 (Ida. 1963).
Clause Cannot
of
Heirs
to

in

paragraph

Invalidate the
Inherit
Under

Second

of

the

Will

granting $5.00 to any person establishing that he or she is
decedent's child, and in paragraph Third of the Will giving
$1.00 to any heir are disinheritance clauses, not bequests.
Estate

of

Kaseroff,

1977); Estate

137 Cal. Rptr. 644, 562 P.2d 325, 327 (Cal.

of Moore,

427 (1963); Estate

See

219 Cal. App. 2d 737, 741, 33 Cal. Rptr.

of Frinchaboy,

108 Cal. App. 2d 235, 238, 238

P.2d 592 (1951) .
A disinheritance clause has no effect whatsoever on assets
passing by intestacy.

When the testator attempts to exclude his

heirs at law from inheriting his property, the exclusion goes
Estate

only to such property as he has disposed of by his Will.
of

Dunn,

260 P.2d 964, 965 (Cal.App. 1953); Estate

239 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
430,

407

P.2d

656,

659

In Estate

of

(Cal. 1965),

Barnes,
the

of

Lefranc,

47 Cal. Rptr.

Supreme

Court

of

California stated the rule governing intestate succession when
the Will contains a disinheritance clause:
It is settled that a disinheritance clause, no matter
how broadly or strongly phrased, operates only to
prevent a claimant from taking under the Will itself .
. . . Such a clause does not and cannot operate to
prevent the heirs at law from taking under the
statutory rules of inheritance when the decedent has
died intestate as to all or any of his property.
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The statutory right of an heir to inherit assets is paramount to
any direction from a testator, other than the valid disposition
of the estate to another individual:
The real question involved is whether when a testatrix
expressly excludes known heirs from participation in
her estate, she may thereby bar them from their
statutory right to succeed to a portion of the estate
undisposed of by the will.
The answer is in the
negative.
If one leaves a part of his estate
undisposed of by his will he will be presumed to have
known that such portion will be distributed under the
statutory rules of succession.
Estate
of Dunn, 260
P.2d 964, 965 (Cal. App. 1953)
An attempt to exclude legal heirs from participation
in the estate of decedent is successful only as to
such property as is disposed of by the will . . . .
A
testator must do more than merely evince an intention
to disinherit before the heirs1 right of succession
can be cut off. He must make a valid disposition of
his property, [citations omitted] Estate
of
Munson,
330 P. 2d 302, 304-305 (Cal. App. 1958)
Other states also hold that disinheritance claims do
not reach heirs-at-law.

"The fact that a person is disinherited

by the will does not prevent his sharing as an heir at law, in
property the testamentary disposition of which has failed by
lapse. . . .

The testator cannot disinherit his heirs by words

alone, but in order to do so the property must be given to
somebody else."

Estate

of

Stroble,

636 P. 2d 236, 242 (Kan.

App. 1981) .
As stated in Page on Wills,
If testator does not dispose of the whole of his
estate by his last will and testament, and such will
contains negative words of exclusion
[i.e., a
disinheritance clause], the great majority of states
hold that such negative words cannot prevent property
from passing under the statutes of descent and

Page 37

distribution. This question comes up, as a rule, when
testator provides specifically in his will that
certain heirs who are named or otherwise indicated
shall not receive any part of his estate., If his will
disposes of part of his property, but not all, such
provision is without effect as to the property to
which he makes no disposition by his will. . . .
If
testator has made a provision for an heir, which he
apparently intends to be all the heir shall receive,
such heir nevertheless takes his share of any
intestate property. . . . Where testator shows by his
whole will that his intention is to exclude certain
near relatives in favor of more distant ones, any
property undisposed of will, nevertheless, descend as
intestate property to such near relatives to the
exclusion of those more remote. 2 Page, A Treatise
on
the Law of Wills
(Third [Lifetime] Edition) pp. 857,
858, 859-60 (emphasis added).
Therefore, the decedentfs property automatically vests
in his heirs at law, as prescribed by Utah Code Annotated §75-3101, subject to probate administration:

"Upon the death of a

person, his real and personal property devolves to persons to
whom it is devised by his last will . . . , or in the absence of
testamentary disposition, to his heirs . . . ."

The maker of a

Will cannot limit the statute of descent and distribution as to
property not disposed of by the Will:

"A testator cannot limit

or eliminate an heir from receiving that portion of an estate
governed by the statute of descent and distribution except by
Re Estate

disposing of the property by Will."
106 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Mich. 1960);
A.2d

837

(RI.

1949).

of

see also Powers

Although

a

Will

may

Emma
v.

Brown,

Powers,

clearly

67
and

unambiguously express an intent to disinherit an heir or next of
kin, such heir or next of kin nevertheless shares in property
which the testator failed to devise to another and as to which
he consequently died intestate.
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Quattlebaum

v.

Simmons

National

Bank,

184 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1954).

Smith,

Similarly, in Re Estate

of

353 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. 1963), the court explained that no

matter how strong the testator's intention to disinherit an heir
may be expressed in a Will, that intention cannot be given any
effect as to intestate property.

The disinheritance clause is

of no consequence because the property will be disposed of by
intestate succession where no assets are disposed of by the
Will.
IV.

DECEDENT'S
A.

HEIRS

Stepchildren

ARE

HIS

Are Not

NEPHEW

AND

TWO

NIECES

Heirs

The law is perfectly clear that stepchildren are not
heirs at law.

As defined in U.C.A. § 75-1-201(3) and (28),

(3)"Child" includes any individual entitled to take as
a child under this code by intestate succession from
the parent whose relationship is involved and excludes
any person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a
grandchild, or any more remote descendant, (emphasis
added)
(28)"Parent" includes any person entitled to take, or
who would be entitled to take, if the child died
without a will, as a parent under this code by
intestate succession from the child whose relationship
is in question and excludes any person who is only a
stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent, (emphasis
added)
Therefore, under

Utah

law,

stepchildren

are not

considered

children for purposes of intestate succession.
This

is consistent

with the

law of other states.

"Under the law of intestate succession, a stepson is not in any
sense an heir of the decedent."
437 (Wash.App. 1974).

Re McLauglin

See also Re Estate

's Estate,

of Smith,

523 P.2d

299 P.2d 550
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(Wash. 1956); Versland

v.

Carson

Transport,

671 P.2d 583 (Mont.

1983) .
B.

The Appellees
Heirs

(Nieces

and

Nephew)

Are

The

Only

Utah Code Annotated §75-2-103(17) defines "heirs" as
those persons "who are entitled under the statutes of intestate
succession

to

the

property

of

Annotated §75-2-103 (1)states:

the

decedent.."

Utah

Code

"the entire intestate estate if

there is no surviving spouse, passes as follows: . . . .(c)
there is no surviving

issue or parent, to the issue of the

parents or either of them by representation"
In turn,

if

"issue" is defined

as

"lineal

(emphasis added) .

descendants

of

all

generations, with the relationship of parent and child at each
generation being determined by the definitions of child and
parent contained in this code."
undisputed

that

the only

U.C.A. § 75-2-103(21).

su^vi^ing

issue of the

It is

decedent's

parents are the three children of the decedent's only sibling.
That nephew and two nieces

(who are the Appellees)

are the

decedent's heirs at law.
V .

SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED
TAKING A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL

ON

HUNT

FOR

DELAY

AND

Pursuant to Rule 33(a), R. Utah S. Ct., or Rule 33, Utah R.
App.

P.,

the Heirs

request

that

they be awarded

attorney's fees in responding to this appeal.
above, Hunt lacks standing to appeal.

costs

and

As has been shown

Even if this Court had

jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the District Court's Order
must be affirmed because the grounds for appeal are meritless.
No

justification
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in

law

or

fact

exists

for

Hunt

to

have

subjected the Heirs to the unnecessary expense and delay of this
appeal.
At the time Hunt filed his Notice of Appeal, Rule 33 (a), R.
Utah

S.

Ct. , and

cases

arising

under

it

established

applicable law regarding sanctions for frivolous appeals.

the
This

Brief therefore discusses the law that arose under that Rule.
We

note,

however,

that

Rule

effective April 1, 1990.
codifies the existing

33, Utah

R.

App.

P.,

became

We believe that the new rule merely

law as it had developed,

and that a

discussion of the new rule for imposition of sanctions under it
is therefore appropriate.
A "frivolous appeal" has been defined as "one having no
reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a) [R.
Utah Ct. App.]"

O'Brien

v.

Rush,

744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App.

1987).

Rule 40(a) required that the action "is well grounded

in

and

fact

argument

for

is warranted
the

by

extension,

existing

law or a good

modification,

or

faith

reversal

of

existing law."
In Eames

v.

Eames,

awarded attorney's

735 P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987), the court

fees and costs to respondent because the

appellant had misstated the facts and the law, and because the
totality of appellant!s argument compelled the Court of Appeals
to find that the appellant was attempting to take unconscionable
advantage of the respondent.

O'Brien

v.

Rush,

744 P.2d 306,

309-310 (Utah App. 1987), then made it clear that a finding of
bad faith was not necessary to a finding that an appeal is
frivolous.
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Sanctions

have

since

been

ordered

in

several

cases,

including for frivolous appeals filed for delay when the order
appealed from was not a final appealable order

(Kathy's

Stores,

Co.,

Inc.,

v. Equitable

Life

501 (Utah 1988); Backstrom

and Casualty

Family

Limited

Ins.

Food

753 P.2d

Partnership

v.

Hall,

751 P. 2d 1157

(Utah App. 1988)) or where the appeal was not

timely (Barber

v.

1988) .

Emporium

Sanctions

were

Partnership,
also

750 P.2d 202 (Utah App.

imposed

where

there

was

no

reasonable basis for the appeal and the appellant's conduct was
"conspicuously bad and offensive, i.e., egregious" in following
a

deliberate

course

of

conduct

designed

purposes of the parties 1 agreement.
Town,

to

Brigham

frustrate
City

v.

the

Mantua

754 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Utah App. 1988).
Finding no legal or factual basis for an appeal that was a

continuation of harassment, the Utah Court of Appeals cited some
of

the

reasons

justifying

sanctions,

when

it

stated

that

sanctions should be imposed when:
"an appeal is obviously without any merit and has been
taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and
results in delayed implementation of the judgment of
the lower court; increased costs of litigation; and
dissipation of the time and resources of the Law
Court." Porco v. Porcor
752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App.
1988), quoting Auburn Harpswell
Ass'n
v. Day, 438 A.2d
234, 239 (Me. 1981).
In Fife
court

v.

awarded

Fife,
fees

111 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah App. 1989), the
for

a

frivolous

appeal

because

it

was

"obvious from the record that the trial court's findings were
not clearly erroneous."
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The same is true in our case.

Finally, in Hunt v.

Hurst,

125 Utah Adv.Rep. 23 (Utah 1990)

this Court in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stewart
addressed the issue of sanctions for a frivolous appeal.
Court

quoted

Black's

Law Dictionary

601

(5th Ed.

This

1979) as

defining a frivolous appeal as " [o]ne in which no justiciable
question has been presented and appeal is readily recognizable
as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can
ever succeed."

125 Utah Adv.Rep. at 25.

The Court then quoted

the new Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Practice.
noted that

"a valid professional

evaluation

would

The Court
reveal a

complete lack of merit to the cause of action, " and emphasized
Id.

that this is not an "arguable case."

The Court noted that

pursuing frivolous claims against blameless defendants is not
justified and that the litigation of new or uncertain issues
will not be chilled by imposing sanctions on those who "pursue
what in reality are nuisance claims."
The rationale of Hunt v.
case.

Hurst

Id.

applies to the facts in our

There is "no justiciable question" and the "appeal is

readily recognizable as devoid of merit in that there is little
prospect that it can ever succeed."
against

blameless

defendants,

negotiating some settlement.

This is a nuisance claim

pursued

in

the

hopes

of

This is particularly true since a

number of items of personal effects (including assets that had
belonged to the Heirs' mother and which are not part of the
estate) were removed from the decedent's residence during Hunt's
tenure

as

personal

representative,

and

have

not

yet

been
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returned to the estate.

It has been reported that many of those

assets have been distributed to the stepchildren.
Rule 33(b), Utah R.App.P., defines a frivolous appeal as
"one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law."
case at bar.

This definition fits the facts in the

Here, there is no merit to the grounds asserted

for appeal, and no reasonable likelihood of success for Hunt.
Indeed, Hunt as the personal representative is not even a proper
party to take this appeal.

Even though he is no longer the

personal

representative,

he has

continued

to prosecute

the

appeal.

Hunt has never appealed in his individual capacity.

Finally, at the trial court and on appeal, Hunt has failed to
cite

any

credible

authority

or

grounds

for

his

position.

Appellant's Brief is nothing more than the time-worn cry of
every unsuccessful

litigant:

"I should have won."

Hunt's

position is not grounded in fact or warranted by existing law,
and no argument has been made for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law.
Further, Hunt misstated, under oath, the identity of the
decedent's heirs at law, in both his Application for Probate and
his Petition for Interpretation of Last Will and Testament.

He

failed to comply with U.C.A. § 75-3-301 (2) (b) , which requires
such identification.

This was an apparent attempt to evade

legal requirements of notice, preventing those most affected
from receiving notice.

This is particularly egregious since

Hunt has been personally acquainted with all of the Heirs for
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Hunt has been personally acquainted with all of the Heirs for
many years, and knows their relationship to the decedent.

The

Petition for Interpretation Of Last Will And Testament appears
to be a blatant attempt to obtain distribution of the estate for
persons

not

entitled

to

the

estate

under

the

law,

intentionally failing to provide notice to the heirs.

while

Hunt has

consistently failed to act in good faith, attempting to gain an
advantage

without

notifying

those

most

affected.

[See

generally, verified petition in Record, pp. 32-33, 1 11, A-I]
Hunt has failed to prepare or file an inventory, even when
repeatedly

requested

by

counsel

ordered to do so by the court.

and

interested

parties

or

To enable the Heirs and the

successor personal representative to determine the assets of the
estate, and to provide a listing of numerous assets taken into
the personal possession of Hunt or others of the stepchildren,
he was ordered by the District Court to file an Inventory and
Appraisement and an accounting no later than December 8, 1989
[Record, pp. 83, 86].

To date, Hunt has failed to file either

the Inventory or the accounting.

His actions serve no proper

purpose and instead are interposed for delay.
Based on the foregoing, it can only be concluded that the
appeal is interposed for an improper purpose, "such as to harass
or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation,"

Rule 40(a), R. Utah S. Ct., or "such as to harass,

cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time
that will benefit only the party
33(b), Utah R.App.P.

filing the appeal."

Rule

An appeal brought for delay is "one marked
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which benefits only the appellant."
306, 310

(Utah App. 1987).

O'Brien

v.

Rush,

744 P.2d

An award of fees and costs under

Rule 33(a) is appropriate in this case.
Hunt's prosecution of an unjusticiable appeal has forced
the Heirs to incur
interests.

substantial

legal fees to protect

their

The Heirs are entitled to recoup that unnecessary

loss from Hunt because the appeal is frivolous and for delay.
CONCLUSION
The District Court's Order identifying the decedent's heirs
affects only the rights of heirs and other potential claimants
between themselves.

Hunt as personal representative

is not

aggrieved by the Order, since the Order does not affect the
estate or the personal representative in his official capacity.
Hunt as the personal representative therefore lacks standing to
appeal.

Further, Hunt resigned as the personal representative

on November 9, 1989; he cannot now prosecute the appeal in that
capacity.

No stepchild filed a notice of appeal individually,

including Hunt.

Summary affirmance of the Order is required in

this situation.
Based on settled law that has existed for centuries, it is
clear that the intention of the testator must be deduced only
from the words of the Will; that where the words of the Will
make no disposition whatsoever of the assets, intestacy results;
that the maxim of law favoring testacy is no greater than the
presumption in favor of heirs, and the maxim gives way where
there is no intention expressed in the Will to dispose of the
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estate to anyone; that the courts will not engage in supposition
or conjecture about a testator's intent where that intent is not
expressed in the words actually used in the Will; and that a
disinheritance clause does not invalidate the statutory right of
heirs to inherit assets passing by intestacy.
The Will in this case does not devise any of the estate; it
contains no words of grant, no reference to any assets, and no
designation that any person

is to receive any assets.

The

testator expressed no intention regarding disposition of his
estate; he is therefore presumed to have intended that no assets
pass under the will, and that all assets pass by intestacy.
Finally, there
dispositive

is no evidence

plan

to

benefit

in the Will of any

dominant

any

gift

stepchild;

no

by

implication arises from the words used by the decedent in the
Will.

A

conclusion:

reading

of

the

Will

compels

but

one

reasonable

the entire estate must pass by intestacy to the

Heirs, who are the Appellees.
Therefore, the Heirs (Appellees) respectfully request that
this Court

(1) affirm the Order of the District

Court,

require Hunt to pay the Heirs' costs and attorneys1

(2)

fees on

appeal because Hunt has forced the Heirs to respond to an appeal
that is frivolous and interposed for delay, and

(3) remand to
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the

District

Court

for

the

determination

of

Appellees 1

attorney's fees on appeal.
Dated:

May 7, 1990
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE
A Professional Corporation

LYL& R. DRAKE
Attorneys for Appellees: Dawna Bool,
Jer^e>:son D. Goulette, and Charlene Brown
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of May, 1990, I
served four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLEES on
each of the following by depositing the copies in the U.S. Mail,
postage pre-paid, addressed to:
Keith F. Oehler, Esq.
P.O. Box 1234
Cedar City, Utah 84721-1234

Lyle R. Drake,
Attorney for Appellees
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File # 5772-01 ;LRD/CHW1

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF )
I
REED DWANE HUNT
jI
Deceased.

ORDER CONSTRUING WILL
AND DETERMINING HEIRS

;
i

Probate No. 3202

This matter came on regularly for hearing on July 11, 1989, Lyle R. Drake
of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake appearing for Petitioners Dawna Bool,
Jefferson D. Goulette, and Charlene Brown, and Keith Oehler appearing for the
personal representative Richard L. Hunt and various stepchildren of the
decedent.

Both parties were heard, and requested an opportunity to file

additional Memoranda Points and Authorities.

Memoranda of Points and

Authorities were filed by both parties and the matter was submitted to the Court
for a ruling without oral argument, pursuant to Rule 04-501.

The Court

considered decedent's Will, the Memoranda of Points and Authorities, and all
documents filed in this matter.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the following findings of facts:
A.

The Will of the decedent dated December 2, 1988, fails to dispose

of any assets.
1

nrnOG9

B.

At the time of his death, the decedent had no living issue, spouse,

parents, or siblings.
C.

Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette and Charlene Brown are the

only children of decedent's only sibling, Jesse Hunt Goulette.
D.

Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette, and Charlene Brown, and their

respective children, are the only living descendents of the decedent's parents.
E.

Richard L Hunt, Dennis Rae Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, and

Denice Marie Buckley are step-children of the decedent, and were never
adopted by the decedent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court makes the following conclusions of law:
A.

The assets of the decedent are not disposed of by his Will and

therefore pass according to the laws of intestate succession, to the heirs of the
decedent.
B.

The disinheritance clauses used in the Will do not prevent an heir

from receiving a statutory intestate share of the estate.
C.

Stepchildren are not heirs of a decedent.

D.

Richard L Hunt, Dennis Rae Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, and

Denice Marie Buckley are not heirs of the decedent.
E.

Richard L. Hunt, Dennis Rae Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, and

Denice Marie Buckley receive nothing under the Will of the decedent, either by
its express terms or by implication.
F.

Pursuant to U.C.A. §75-2-103 (1), Dawna Bool, Jefferson D.

Goulette, and Charlene Brown are the only heirs at law of the decedent.
G.

Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette, and Charlene Brown are the

sole beneficiaries, in equal shares, of the entire estate of the decedent under
his Will.
2

H.

Notice has been given as required by law.

WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1.

The heirs of the decedent are Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette,

and Charlene Brown.
2.

The entire estate of the decedent vests in and shall be distributed

to Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette and Charlene Brown in equal shares,
subject to administration.
DATED this

s^ day of

, 1989.

J^«XPHILIP EVE
istrict Court JiSdge

READ ANOArPnCJ¥ED on this

1LER,
'ersonal Representative

•U10071

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of September, 1989, I served a
signed copy of the foregoing ORDER CONSTRUING WILL AND DETERMINING
HEIRS on each of the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Keith S. Oehler, Esq.
P.O. Box 1234
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Secretary

4

^
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DEPUTY,

-LUr

v_

Keith F. Oehler f A2^49)
Attorney for Personal ReDresentative
216 South 200 West
P.O. Box 1234
Cedar Citv, Utah 84721-1234
(801) 586-3711
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

:

REED DWANE HUNT,

:

NOTICE OF APPEAL

:

Probate No. 3202

'

£#

Deceased.

NOTICE
Representative
to

the

Utah

Construing

is hereby

given

of the Estate
Court

Will

of

that Richard

of Reed

Appeals

and Determining

from

Dwane
the

L. Hunt, Personal

Hunt, hereby

District

Heirs entered

10%^

appeals

Court's

Order

in this action

on

September 5, 1939.
DATED this 5th day o

;y for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and complete
of the foregoing

Notice

of Appeal

CODV

to Lyle R. Drake, Esq., SNOW,

nonmp.

NUFFER, ENGSTROM

& DRAKE, 90 East

200 North, P.O.

Box 4 0 0 , St.

George, Utah 34771-0400, postage thereon fully prepaid, this 5th
day of October, 1989.

iarbara B. Oenler
Legal Secretary

RDHUNT.
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Statutes

and

Rules

Whose

Interpretation

Is

Determinative

Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(3):
(3) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take
as a child under this code by intestate succession
from the parent whose relationship is involved and
excludes any person who is only a stepchild, a foster
child, a grandchild, or any more remote descendant.
(emphasis added)
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(17):
(17)

"Heirs" means

those

persons,

including

the

surviving spouse, who are entitled under the statutes
of intestate succession to the property of a decedent,
(emphasis added)
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(21):
(21) "Issue" of a person means all his lineal
descendants of all generations, with the relationship
of parent and child at each generation being
determined by the definitions of child and parent
contained in this code.
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(28):
(28) "Parent" includes any person entitled to take, or
who would be entitled to take, if the child died
without a will, as a parent under this code by
intestate succession from the child whose relationship
is in question and excludes any person who is only a
stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent, (emphasis
added)
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-101:
Any part of the estate of a decedent not effectively
disposed of by his will passes to his heirs as
prescribed in the following sections of this code.

Utah Code Annotated §75-2-103(1) (c) :
. the entire intestate estate
surviving spouse, passes as follows:

if there

is no

(c) If there is no surviving issue or parent, to the
issue
of
the
parents or either of them by
representation" (emphasis added).
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-603:
The intention of a testator as expressed in his will
controls the legal effect of his dispositions.
The
rules of construction expressed in the succeeding
sections of this part apply unless a contrary
intention is indicated by the will, (emphasis added)
Utah Code Annotated §75-3-101:
The power of a person to leave property by will and
the rights of creditors, devisees, and heirs to his
property are subject to the restrictions and
limitations contained in this code to facilitate the
prompt settlement of estates.
Upon the death of a

person his rs&I and personal property devolves La
persons to whom it is devised by his last will or to
those indicated as substitutes for them in cases
involving lapse, renunciation, or other circumstances
affecting the devolution of testate estate, or in the

absence of testamentary disposition, to his heirs, or
to those indicated as substitutes for them in cases
involving
renunciation
or other
circumstances
affecting devolution of intestate estates, subject to
homestead allowance, exempt property and family
allowance, rights of creditors, elective share of the
surviving spouse, and administration, (emphasis added)
Rule 52 (a), U.R.C.P.:
(a) Effect.
In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conditions of law thereon, and judgment shall be
entered pursuant to Rule 58A
Findings of
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court
to judge the credibility of the
witnesses . . . .

Rule 33(a), R. Utah S. Ct.:
(a)
Damages for delay or frivolous appeal.
If
the court shall determine that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for
delay, it shall award just damages and single or
double costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to
the prevailing party.
Rule 40(a), R. Utah S. Ct.:
the signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
brief . . .; that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, formed after reasonable
inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
and that it is not interposed for any improper
purposes, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay
or needless in the cost of litigation. . . .
Rule 33, Utah R. App. P.:

see following page

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the couit determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
<c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.
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declare this to he my last Will and revoke all other Wills previously mads by me:
FWHT: I Reed Dwane Hunt being of sound and disposing mind and memory,
and not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence of any person
whomsoever, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my Last Will
and Testament, hereby revoking~any and all Wills, Codicils or Testamentary dispositions by me at any time heretofore made.
Second: I declare that I am a single man, and that I have four (4) stepchildern. Richard L Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, Denice Marie Buckley,
and Dennis Ray Hunt. If, at any time, any person shall be established
by a Court of Law to be a child of mine, then I give and bequeath to
each such person the sum of Five Dollars ($5.00) and no more.
Third: I have intentionally and with full knowledge omitted to provide
for any and all of my heirs and next of kin who are not specifically
mentioned herein, and I hereby generally and specifically disinherit
each, any and all persons whomsoever claiming to be or who may be
lawfully determined to be my heirs at law, except as otherwise mentioned
in this Will; and to any person or persons who shall sucessfully establish
in a Court of competent jurisdiction, that he or she is entilted to any
portion of my estate, other than as mentioned in this Will, I hereby
give and bequeath to such person or persons the sum of ONE DOLLAR
($1.00) and no more, in lieu of any other share or interest in my
estate.
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which I may own or be entitled to at his discretion.
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, in our presence, we being present at the same

time, and... he then declared to us that the said inttrument was h.is... last Witt; and we, at
the request of said ^SS^JiSSSSJ^BS.

^ and in / L i * , presence, and tn

the presence of each other, have signed the same as witnesses. Wc further declare that at the
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